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ABSTRACT: There is no unique idea regarding the form of the (Intentional) content 
part of visual experience in the specification. The philosophers’ approaches diverge as to 
whether the content of visual experience is equivalent to a sentence expressing proposi-
tion or not. Some of them (mainly philosophers from the phenomenological tradition) 
consider that one must use a proposition for the specification of the content only when 
the subject, while having a visual experience, exercise a concept or judge. For the other 
cases, which can be called simple seeing, a noun phrase is preferable. I argue that, holding 
that the specification of Intentional content of the visual experience should be in the 
form of a proposition, John Searle gives up the first-person Intentionality and therefore 
bypasses the first-person important distinction between simple seeing and judgmental 
seeing. The specification of the content only in the form of the proposition does not al-
low making such a distinction on the level of description. Then I argue that the feature 
of the causal self-referentiality of the visual experience belongs to its psychological mode 
but not, as Searle holds, to the Intentional content of the visual experience. 
KEYWORDS: Intentional content – Searle – visual experience.  
1. Introduction 
 Every theory of Intentionality is to explain how the Intentional state 
must be individuated. For this purpose, most theories of Intentionality dis-
tinguish the psychological mode of the Intentional state from the objects 
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or state of affairs it is directed at. These are two crucial points in the indi-
viduation of the state. The Intentional states such as a visual experience that 
there is a yellow wagon there and a remembrance that there is a yellow wa-
gon there are directed at the same state of affairs, whereas their psychologi-
cal modes are different. Yet a visual experience that there is a yellow wagon 
there and a visual experience that a man is walking in the garden are psycho-
logically the same, but are different Intentional states; because the state of 
affairs at which they are directed are different. 
 However, it is not sufficient for the individuation of an Intentional 
state, since there can be cases where the psychological mode and the object 
are the same, but the Intentional states are still different. For the same ob-
ject I might have a belief that there is a yellow wagon there and that there is  
a yellow cubic form thing there. Therefore, most theories of Intentionality 
distinguish still one point – Intentional content of the state. The Inten-
tional content of the state contains the mode of presentation of objects or 
state of affairs. When we specify the content, we make explicit how our In-
tentional state is directed at its object.  
 To this we should add that, when the content is complex, its structure 
order also becomes important for the individuation of the Intentional state. 
For example, my visual experiences that the pen is on the paper and that the 
paper is on the pen are different. Because though the contents of the states 
have the same constituents, their structure orders are distinct.  
 The content is brought into light in reflection on the Intentional 
state by a person who directly experiences it. So the specification of the 
content should be committed to the subject’s mode of (re)presentation of 
objects or states of affairs toward which the Intentional state is directed. 
If I see an apple tree and specify the content of my visual experience as an 
apple tree, or that this is an apple tree, the specification of the content is 
exactly committed to my mode of presentation of that object. Even if  
I know much more about apple trees, I cannot specify my knowledge on 
the content, substitute an apple tree, say, with the description a deciduous 
tree whose fruits I like to eat, which might be implicit at the moment of 
the visual experience, or add any implicit knowledge to the content. If  
I do so, then it means that my specification does not express how the 
content exactly is.  
 However, there is no unique idea regarding the form of the content part 
of visual experience in the specification. The philosophers’ approaches di-
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verge as to whether the content of visual experience is equivalent to a prop-
osition or not. Some of them (mainly philosophers from the phenomeno-
logical tradition) consider that one must use a proposition for the specifica-
tion of the content only when the subject, while having a visual experience, 
exercise a concept or judge (cf. Mulligan 1995, 170). For the other cases, 
which are called simple seeing, a noun phrase is preferable. Searle, however, 
maintains that the linguistic correlate of the content should be a sentence 
expressing proposition.  
 In what follows I will argue that, holding that the specification of In-
tentional content of the visual experience should be in the form of a propo-
sition, Searle gives up the first-person Intentionality and therefore bypasses 
the first-person important distinction between simple seeing and judgmen-
tal seeing. Moreover, if we hold the view that the role of the content in the 
individuation of the state consists in its containing the mode of presenta-
tion of objects or state of affairs, then Searle’s theses that the specification 
of the content of the visual experience is propositional and that the specifi-
cation of the causal self-referentiality of the visual experience is to be made 
explicit in the content of that state do not match that function of the con-
tent of the Intentional state. Then I will argue that the causal self-
referentiality and the other features of the visual experience belong to its 
psychological mode but not to the Intentional content of the visual expe-
rience.  
 Before touching these problems in a detailed way, let us first briefly 
consider some ideas from Searle’s conception of the visual experience, 
which are apt for this paper. 
2. Searle’s conception of the visual experience 
 Searle’s conception of the visual experience is a part of his theory of In-
tentionality whose main idea is that “[…] every Intentional state consists of 
an Intentional content in a psychological mode. Where that content is a whole 
proposition and where there is a direction of fit, the Intentional content 
determines the conditions of satisfaction1
                                                     
1  The conditions of satisfaction is not an unambiguous notion. In Intentionality, 
where this notion is clarified, Searle writes: 
” (Searle 1983, 12). The visual expe-
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rience as a kind of the Intentional state also bears these features. For Searle, 
“[i]t does not just make reference to an object”, but its “[…] content re-
quires the existence of a whole state of affairs if it is to be satisfied” (Searle 
1983, 40). Therefore, he holds that the content of the visual experience has 
to be propositional. For example, if “I have a visual experience of a yellow 
station wagon”, the content of my visual experience is that there is a yellow 
station wagon there, but not merely a yellow station wagon. But this is not all; 
for he additionally holds that some kind of Intentional states (intentions, 
orders, and visual experiences) have more complicated content than what 
one can specify by directly reflecting on it. The visual experiences, like in-
tentions and orders, for Searle, are causally self-referential, and this feature 
should be specified in the content of those states. So, according to him, the 
Intentional content of the visual experience of a yellow station wagon has 
to be made explicit in the following form:  
                                                     
Conditions of satisfaction are those conditions which, as determined by the In-
tentional content, must obtain if the state is to be satisfied. For this reason the 
specification of the content is already a specification of the conditions of satis-
faction. Thus, if I have a belief that it is raining, the content of my belief is: 
that it is raining. And the conditions of satisfaction are: that it is raining – and 
not, for example, that the ground is wet or that water is falling out of the sky. 
(Searle 1983, 12-13) 
From this passage we can see that, by holding that they have the same specification, 
Searle endorses the conditions of satisfaction to be depended on the Intentional con-
tent. According to his “it is raining” example – since it holds that if the same state of 
affairs was believed under a different aspect, the conditions of satisfaction of the corres-
ponding Intentional state would be different – one can even maintain that, like the con-
tent, the conditions of satisfaction contain a mode of representation of the state of af-
fairs. R. McIntyre, considering a similar interpretation, suggests that “conditions of sa-
tisfaction must be stated from the subject’s point of view” (McIntyre 1984, 472). Howev-
er, when we deal with this notion in the context of Searle’s theory of perception, we see 
that his use of this notion is equivalent to the third-person notion of state of affairs, ra-
ther than to the subject’s view-point. Here, for Searle, “conditions of satisfaction are al-
ways that such and such is the case.” In what follows, corresponding to the context in 
which Searle uses it, we will take the notion of conditions of satisfaction to be equiva-
lent to the notion of state of affairs. 
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 I have a visual experience (that there is a yellow station wagon there 
and that there is a yellow station wagon there is causing this visual ex-
perience). (Searle 1983, 48)  
 The idea here is that, in the perceptual cases, it is necessary for the vis-
ual experience to be caused by the conditions of satisfaction of this very 
visual experience. Otherwise, the visual experience is not a perception;2
                                                     
2  Searle makes a distinction, which seems to me superfluous, between the visual expe-
rience and the perception. According to this distinction, the perception involves the no-
tion of succeeding. The visual experience, however, might be unsuccessful either. The 
hallucination or illusion, for example, do possess a visual experience, but these are not 
perception cases. Yet this distinction violates the intuitive idea that Intentional states 
with the direction of fit must have two values regarding the satisfaction of their condi-
tions; they can be either satisfied or unsatisfied. The beliefs, for example, can be either 
true or false. According to Searle’s visual experience/perception distinction, visual expe-
riences can have these two values, but perceptions, in order to be perceptions, must only 
be satisfied; because, for Searle, when they are not satisfied, they are not unsatisfied per-
ceptions, what they logically must be if they are Intentional state with a direction of fit, 
rather unsatisfied visual experiences. So it turns out that the perception must only be 
true of its conditions of satisfaction – which is logically not the case. Though Searle 
uses the mentioned notions interchangeably, this can show that the visual experience/ 
perception distinction is superfluous. 
 it 
might be a hallucination, or another kind of misperception. And for Searle, 
that the visual experience must be caused by its conditions of satisfaction is 
part of the conditions of satisfaction of this visual experience; therefore, it 
has to be specified in the content of that experience. 
3. Is the content of the visual experience equivalent  
to a proposition? 
 Searle’s main reason to state that the content of visual experience is 
propositional is that it “[…] is an immediate (and trivial) consequence of 
the fact that they have conditions of satisfaction, for conditions of satisfac-
tion are always that such and such is the case” (Searle 1983, 41). As men-
tioned above, the Intentional content, for Searle, always requires a state of 
affairs for its satisfaction (cf. Searle 1983, 41).  
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 Two understandings of this view can be put forward. The first under-
standing is possible in terms of the assumption that every particular object 
(since it has properties) can be treated as a state of affairs; the second can 
be suggested in terms of the basic characteristic of the situation of seeing. 
Let us begin with the first.  
 Suppose my seeing a station wagon. The station wagon I see has prop-
erties. It has a color, weight, a certain place in the space; it can be old, 
without repair, and so on. That is, the object seen is, so to speak, a bundle 
of different states of affairs. Nevertheless, from Searle’s example we can see 
that the phrases there and in front of me refer to the space relation between 
particulars, between the subject and the object, rather than to any property 
of the object perceived. Therefore, to hold the first view would be incor-
rect. 
 What Searle means is presumably the second, which can be called the 
situation of seeing. It is simple to note that in the situation of seeing 
there must be at least two particulars – one of them must necessarily be 
the person who sees and the other(s) must be object(s) of seeing – and  
a spatial relation between them, so that the person can see the object(s). 
This is a sufficient reason to state that seeing requires a state of affairs, 
but to my mind, not sufficient to state that the Intentional content of 
seeing (or visual experience) requires a state of affairs. Because the notion 
of situation of seeing we use here is a notion of the third-person view, 
whereas the notion of Intentional content of the visual experience indi-
cates a phenomenological fact, the person’s mode of presentation of that 
situation, but not refer to it from the “outside”.3
 However, one might argue that, insofar as everybody has a belief that 
seeing entails the existence of an object in the field of vision, there must be 
an implicit sense in the content of every seeing that what is seen is always 
before the person experiencing this visual experience. Therefore, it would 
be reasonable to hold that the spatial indexicals such as “there” or “here” 
can be made explicit in the content of seeing. So, for example, it might be 
suggested that the content of my visual experience of a station wagon 
should be described by the noun phrase a station wagon there. Below, I will 
 Accordingly, they 
should have different specifications.  
                                                     
3 That might be seen as a bare stipulation, but Searle seems to agree with this, for he 
holds that he deals with “first-person Intentionality”. 
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show that such a specification of the content would be incorrect as well. 
But now I want to emphasize that the specification of the content with the 
proposition that there is a station wagon there would be also indefinite. Be-
cause if the situation was described from the third-person view, we could 
hold that, for the description is the description of a state of affairs, it must 
be in the form of proposition. Yet if we hold that this is a description from 
“first-person Intentionality”, then it must be committed to the person’s 
view of the situation which, depending on the person, can be seen either as 
an object, or as a state of affairs. Thus, if the person sees the situation as  
a state of affairs, it is preferable to describe it with a proposition; if not, 
then, for it would be different way of seeing, the description should be 
conducted with a noun phrase. In other words, the specification of the 
content must be the specification of how the subject experiences it. 
 If we give up this thesis and hold the view that the specification of the 
content of seeing must be only propositional, then ambiguities in the de-
scription will be inevitable. Because from the intuitive level of experiencing 
our visual experiences we know that we should distinguish between simple 
seeing and judgmental seeing. This distinction 
[…] is evident from the fact that at any given moment we perceive many 
more objects, and features of objects, than we make judgments about. 
When I look out of my window at my garden and judge on the basis of 
what I see that the tree in my garden is blooming, I see at that moment 
other plants besides the tree. I also see at that moment many more fea-
tures of that tree besides its blossoms, features, about which I judge (at 
that moment) nothing at all. (Miller 1984, 34)  
 To put it otherwise, in most cases when we have visual experiences, we 
do not judge; we simply perceive. A judgmental seeing, however, is enter-
tained when we make judgments on the basis of our visual experiences 
which are concurrent with those judgments.  
 If we make such a distinction between simple seeing and judgmental 
seeing, it is simple necessity that descriptions of the content of these expe-
riences must also be distinguished from each other. And it is useful to em-
ploy noun phrases for the first cases, and propositions for the second cases, 
in order to show these two different ways of seeing on the descriptive level. 
 Searle’s neglection of this convention derives from the fact that, though 
he deals with “first-person Intentionality”, he passes over the distinction 
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between simple seeing and judgmental seeing, which is an evident pheno-
menological fact, and specifies the contents of visual experiences with  
a whole proposition in terms of the third-person view, which does not al-
low noticing this distinction. 
4. The causal self-referentiality as a feature  
of the psychological mode 
 Now let us consider Searle’s thesis that the causal self-referentiality of 
the visual experience has to be specified in the content of that experience. 
For this purpose, let us put aside his view that the content of seeing is 
equivalent to a proposition. Because whether the content is propositional 
or not is irrelevant here; for both cases we observe the same fact: what is 
initially specified in the content is enriched by the contentual constituents 
which are step by step made explicit. For example, while seeing a station 
wagon, we first realize that the content of my visual experience is not simp-
ly a station wagon, but a station wagon there (or there is a station wagon there). 
Then, analyzing more deeply, it is figured out that the visual experiences 
have the feature of causal self-referentiality which should also be specified 
in the content.  
 Here I am going to show that the features of the visual experien- 
ces such as causal self-referentiality, or thereness, do not belong to the 
content and therefore cannot be specified in the content of the visual ex-
periences. 
 The fact that does not let specify the content of my seeing that there is 
such and such there as that there is such and such there and that there is such and 
such there is causing this visual experience (cf. Searle 1983, 48) could be that 
the part of content which describes the causal self-referentiality of my visu-
al experience is not accessible to my reflection on the content from the first 
person view. No matter how much I would reflect on my content of the 
visual experience, I cannot find in it “that there is a yellow station wagon 
there is causing this visual experience.” This is evident from the fact that 
whenever we see we do not exercise the concept of the causality in the con-
tent of our experience. 
 Yet Searle himself foresees this problem. He adds that “[…] the sense in 
which the visual experience is self-referential is simply that it figures in its 
 S E A R L E  O N  T H E  I N T E N T I O N A L  C O N T E N T  O F  V I S U A L  E X P E R I E N C E S  353 
 
 
own conditions of satisfaction”, but “[…] not that it contains a verbal or 
other representation of itself […]” (Searle 1983, 49). By this Searle means 
that the part specifying the causal self-referentiality in the content is not  
a representation as the other normal part. Rather, it is the specification of 
conditions of satisfaction what requires the causal self-referentiality to be 
added into the content.4
 It is the feature of self-givenness of the object what compels philoso-
phers to specify the visual experience by distinct ways. Most philosophers, 
including Searle – as we have seen – specify this basic feature of seeing with 
using different indexicals in the content part of the specification. D.W. 
Smith, for example, uses the indexicals this or that, arguing that the con-
tent of seeing has a demonstrative element. By this he means “[…] that fea-
ture of a visual experience – that part of its intentional character – which 
 
 However, to my mind, if we hold that the content’s function is to de-
termine how the state exactly relates itself to the world, and accept the in-
tuitive idea in terms of which is made a distinction between the content 
and psychological mode of the Intentional state – namely, the idea that, 
while the psychological mode is held, the content of the state can vary de-
pending on constituents (and their structure order) of which it consists or 
vice versa – then the specification of the causal self-referentiality in the 
content seems to be incorrect.  
 To see this, let us pose a question: What makes the visual experience  
a psychologically distinct kind of the Intentional state? We can answer this 
question by observing that the Intentional state called the visual experience 
is intuitively distinct from other kinds of Intentional states. That is, as we 
have a visual experience, we experience typologically special Intentional 
state whose distinctness is evidently noticed from the first-person view 
when we compare it with the other kinds of Intentional states; in visual 
experiences we experience the Intentional object as sensuously self-given. 
We can represent the same object in different Intentional states; we can 
remember, desire it (cf. Husserl 1970, LI V, §20). However, it is easy to 
observe that when we give up seeing and change the psychological mode, 
though the content can remain, the self-givenness of the object also disap-
pears.  
                                                     
4 This view is the continuation of Searle’s idea that the Intentional content and the 
conditions of satisfaction have the same specification (cf. Searle 1983, 13). 
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consists in its being a presentation of a particular object visually before the 
subject” (Smith 1989, 41). D.W. Smith mentions two features which for 
him are derived from the demonstrative content: 1) “a singular presentation 
of a particular object ‘itself’”; and 2) “a presentation of a particular object 
sensuously before the subject” and its “causing this very experience.” In other 
words, the demonstrative content this engenders two features which is de-
scribed by still two indexicals: itself for the singularity, and there (or here) 
for an object’s being before the subject so that the object can cause this ex-
perience. If we explicate all this features, the content of our visual expe-
rience of a station wagon, according to Smith, will be: this station wagon it-
self there and causing this very experience (cf. Smith 1989, 45).  
 However, what Searle firstly emphasizes is not that- or thisness of the 
content, but thereness of the object, which, according to Smith, is derivable 
from thisness of seeing. But at any rate, for Searle, the causal feature is also 
derivable from thereness, in other words, from the fact that the object seen 
is sensuously before the subject. In a nutshell, both philosophers agree that 
the indexical feature of the visual experience should be specified in the con-
tent. That seems to me unjustifiable.  
 One basic reason that makes me suspicious of the specification of there-
ness in the content of the visual experience is its relatedness or reducibility 
to the self-consciousness. Self-consciousness “happens for the experiencing 
subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly 
marked as my experience” (Gallagher – Zahavi 2005). However, it is the ea-
siest explicable feature of Intentional states. If I make explicit the content 
of my visual experience together with the self-consciousness, I would have 
to use the proposition I see a station wagon, which refers to “a whole state of 
affairs”. Now, if the causal feature is reducible to thereness, considering that 
the situation of seeing involves at least two particulars (subject and object) 
and a spatial relation between them, then one can assimilate that I see a sta-
tion wagon into that there is a station wagon there. Because in the latter prop-
osition a station wagon refers to the object seen, but the subject – I – is 
hidden or implicit under the spatial indexical there. In other words, there 
here refers to a certain place which is only there from the perspective of the 
person who sees that object. It is in virtue of the self-consciousness that 
the subject is conscious of the object’s being in front of her, or there, in the 
visual experience. If there were no self-consciousness, then, whether it be 
implicit or explicit, she could not have the sense there. Therefore, there 
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necessarily implies the second particular as an implicitly self-conscious sub-
ject. 
 This speculation shows that thereness and the causal feature of seeing is 
derived from deeper structures of consciousness and that is why it cannot 
be made explicit in the specification of Intentional content, which is the 
surface, more vulnerable to changes, aspect of consciousness with the func-
tion to determine how the Intentional state exactly relates itself to the 
world at the given moment. Thisness or thereness, as well as causal self-
referentiality, however, are features that, independent of the content, be-
long to each satisfied visual experience; if one has a satisfied visual expe-
rience, she has these features necessarily. They always recur regardless of 
the content, making that kind of Intentional states be identical to them-
selves (from the standpoint of their psychological mode).  
 The other reason which does not allow specifying thereness and the 
causal feature in the content, like in the case of propositional/noun phrase 
specification of the content, is related to the conventional side of the de-
scription. Namely, if we specify the features of seeing in the content, then 
the ambiguities can take place. Suppose a wagon station to be near on my 
road to the railway station and suppose that it is first time that I see it. 
While seeing it, I simply pay attention to its being a station wagon. If 
somebody asked me “what do you see?” my answer would be “I see a station 
wagon” or “I see that this is a station wagon”; because the other properties 
of the station wagon are irrelevant for me. Now suppose another case 
where, while seeing a station wagon, I am interested in seeing a station wa-
gon with considering its place, but I have no any description for its place. 
Then the content of my visual experience would be a station wagon there. 
Now, this there is distinct from Searle’s (or Smith’s) specification of there in 
the content in the sense that it is taken to be explicit together with a sta-
tion wagon, but is not made explicit in terms of the philosophical medita-
tion on the visual experience as a kind of Intentional state. Yet, by specify-
ing the content with there for all (re)presentationally different cases of visu-
al experience of the same object, we cannot distinguish whether there in the 
content expresses the explicitness of subject’s considering the place of the 
object or is made explicit by the meditation as an implicit feature which is 
general for all visual experiences independent of what the content explicitly 
represents. Hence, if we want to make explicit these features, it would be 
correct to ascribe the part specifying thereness, or the causal self-
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referentiality (…that there is such and such there is causing this visual expe-
rience), not to the content of the state but to its psychological mode. How-
ever, since the verbs that stand for the psychological mode perform this 
function, we do not usually do such specifications. When I specify my see-
ing an object, say, as I see that this is such and such, the verb see here, for it 
refers to the psychological mode of my Intentional state, stands for the fea-
ture of thereness and the causal self-referentiality as well. To put it other-
wise, to use the relevant (verb) expressions as shorthand for the psychologi-
cal modes, or for their features, together with the expressions specifying 
the content, is sufficient for the whole specification of the visual expe-
rience.  
5. Conclusion 
 I have considered that Searle gives up the first-person Intentionality 
when he analyses the specification of Intentional content of the visual ex-
perience and therefore bypasses the first-person important distinction be-
tween simple seeing and judgmental seeing. The specification of the con-
tent only in the form of the sentence expressing proposition does not allow 
making such a distinction on the level of description. Then I have argued 
that the causal self-referentiality and the other features of the visual expe-
rience such as thereness belong to its psychological mode but not to the In-
tentional content of the visual experience.  
References 
GALLAGHER, S. – ZAHAVI, D. (2005): Phenomenological Approaches to Self-
Consciousnes. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.  
HUSSERL, E. (1970): Logical Investigations. Vol. 2. Translated by J. N. Findlay. London: 
Routledge.  
MCINTYRE, R. (1984): Searle on Intentionality. Inquiry 27, 468-483. 
MILLER, I. (1984): Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness. Cambridge: The MIT 
Press.  
MULLIGAN, K. (1995): Perception. In: Smith, B. – Smith, D.W. (eds.): The Cambridge 
Companion to Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 168-238. 
 S E A R L E  O N  T H E  I N T E N T I O N A L  C O N T E N T  O F  V I S U A L  E X P E R I E N C E S  357 
 
 
SEARLE, J.R. (1983): Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
SMITH, D.W. (1989): The Circle of Acquaintance. Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
